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Note
When Sosa Meets Iqbal: Plausibility Pleading in
Human Rights Litigation
Jordan D. Shepherd∗
In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a claim by a
Mexican national against U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency
agents and other defendants under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS), which provides federal jurisdiction over tort claims by
aliens.1 The plaintiff argued that the ATS provided U.S. courts
with subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and remedy his claim
for arbitrary detention in violation of international law.2 The
Court did not agree, but neither did it disagree. Although the
Court found that his particular claim did not implicate a cognizable norm of customary international law,3 it saw no “reason
. . . to shut the door” for federal courts to exercise jurisdiction
over certain common-law causes of action pleaded under the
ATS.4 The Court’s holding validated almost twenty-five years of
human rights case law that has been used to hold individual
and corporate violators accountable for human rights norms.5
∗ J.D. May 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; M.A. 2006, Texas
Tech University. For tremendous support and encouragement throughout law
school, I sincerely thank Professors Jennifer Green, David Weissbrodt, and
Duane Krohnke. I appreciate the dedication of the Editors and Staff of the
Minnesota Law Review, especially Nadia Aboussir, Joe Hansen, and Laura
Arneson. I dedicate this Note to Jennifer Neal Heuss: without you, none of this
would be possible. Copyright © 2011 by Jordan D. Shepherd.
1. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (2006). While courts have also used the terms “Alien Tort Claims Act”
and “Alien Tort Act,” most courts—and this Note—now use “Alien Tort Statute.” See Viet. Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d
104, 113 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining the development and citing cases).
2. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697.
3. Id. at 738.
4. Id. at 731.
5. See Sandra Coliver, Jennie Green & Paul Hoffman, Holding Human
Rights Violators Accountable by Using International Law in U.S. Courts: Advocacy Efforts and Complementary Strategies, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 169,
170 (2005) (discussing the line of cases that began with Filártiga v. PeñaIrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)).
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While many procedural and substantive issues remain unresolved, courts continue to recognize causes of action for torture
and other human rights violations in the global effort to end
impunity.6
In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a claim by a
Pakistani national against John Ashcroft and Robert Mueller,
the United States’ top law enforcement officials at the time.7
Bringing a Bivens8 action for unconstitutional racial and religious discrimination by government officials, the plaintiff alleged that these defendants had designed and implemented a
policy intended to discriminate against Arab-Muslims in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11.9 The Court extended its Bell Atlantic v. Twombly plausibility standard10 to reject his allegations as “conclusory” and dismiss his claims as not “plausible.”11 In a move widely interpreted as a major overhaul of the
U.S. system of notice pleading,12 the Court granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint and apparently adopted heightened pleading standards in “‘all civil actions.’”13
Taken together, these two Supreme Court decisions have
specific implications in human rights litigation. First, the holding of Sosa on subject-matter jurisdiction has set a high threshold for courts to hear cases seeking to hold human rights violators accountable for their actions in U.S. courts.14 Following the
Supreme Court’s emphasis on judicial discretion in that case,15
litigants progressively have faced and surmounted a number of
procedural and substantive hurdles in applying the modern

6. Id. at 224 –26.
7. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
8. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
9. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942–43.
10. 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
11. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950–51.
12. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised:
A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 850–51 (2010)
(retracting his pre-Iqbal interpretation of Twombly).
13. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
14. See generally Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The Door Is
Still Ajar” for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533,
551 (2004) (discussing challenges and noting the “cautious approach” to recognizing actionable norms found in Sosa and in most lower courts).
15. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (requiring federal
courts to exercise “a restrained conception of . . . discretion” in recognizing
causes of action under the ATS).
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ATS.16 Subsequently, Iqbal’s revision of pleading standards in
civil litigation creates a potential procedural barrier to ATS
suits seeking to vindicate the rights of victims of egregious human rights violations. For ATS claims, like the discrimination
claim in Iqbal,17 discovery is a vital tool to obtain evidence that
is beyond the control of plaintiffs. In the pre-Iqbal world of civil
litigation, pleadings were the first, simple step to move a case
to the fact-bound inquiries of discovery.18 Following the Court’s
interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) to require a plausible statement of the claim for relief, many plaintiffs may be caught in a “catch 22.” To reach discovery and the
factual evidence needed to substantiate the claim, a plaintiff
must file a well-pleaded complaint; yet after Iqbal, a complaint
is only well-pleaded if it already reflects factual material that
may be obtainable only through discovery.19 It seems the
movement to bring human rights violators to justice must clear
a burdensome procedural hurdle.20
This Note considers the effects on human rights litigation
under the ATS of the Supreme Court’s new statement on pleading standards in Iqbal. Part I describes the development of the
ATS, as well as that of pleading standards in U.S. civil litigation. Part II analyzes ATS motions to dismiss in light of the
new pleading standard, focusing on the variety of ways different jurisdictions have approached plausibility pleading in ATS
cases. It considers courts’ recognition (or lack thereof) of the
distinction between jurisdictional motions to dismiss under
16. Joseph T. McLaughlin & Justin H. Bell, Mass Litigation: New Limitations on the Exercise of Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Statute, ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY, SN066 ALI-ABA 199, 209–16 (2008) (discussing doctrines
and citing cases).
17. Brief for Respondent Javaid Iqbal at 18–19, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No.
07-1015) (discussing the Second Circuit’s receptivity toward “cabined” discovery).
18. Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 824 –26 (2010) (giving the historical background of pleadings).
19. Brief for National Civil Rights Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No. 07-1015) (expanding
this argument and giving examples from civil rights cases).
20. In the context of civil rights suits, this problem is well known. See,
e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley
Era, 52 HOW. L.J. 99 (2008) (analyzing the early effects of Twombly on civil
rights claims). Senator Arlen Specter introduced a bill immediately after the
Court decided Iqbal in an attempt to counter the effects of that decision. See
Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009). Representative Jerrold Nadler introduced a similar bill in the House. See Open
Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009).
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Rule 12(b)(1) and merits-based challenges under Rule 12(b)(6)
along with their respective standards of review. Part III finds
that the broad similarities between the Court’s policy justifications in Sosa and Twombly-Iqbal support the narrow application of the former to Rule 12(b)(1) motions and the latter to
Rule 12(b)(6) motions. This Note concludes that this narrow
approach, found more clearly in the case law of the Second Circuit rather than the Eleventh, adequately balances the needs of
plaintiffs and defendants in Rule 12 motions in human rights
litigation.
I. SOSA’S HISTORICAL PARADIGM TEST AND IQBAL’S
PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD
To set the backdrop for the discussion of pleading standards in ATS cases, this Part develops in two sections. The first
section begins by describing the development of human rights
litigation—from the enactment of the ATS in 1789, through the
seminal case of Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,21 to the Supreme
Court’s only comprehensive analysis of the statute in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain.22 It then expounds Sosa’s test for ATS subject-matter jurisdiction and, finally, reviews how courts have
applied that test. The next section considers pleading standards under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and whether
the Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal heightened those
pleading standards. This overview—first, of ATS litigation, and
second, of pleading standards—lays the groundwork for an
analysis of the unique interaction of Sosa and Twombly-Iqbal
in understanding the plausibility standard in human rights litigation.
A. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: FROM 1789 TO THE PRESENT
Enacted in the First Judiciary Act of 1789, Judge Friendly
once dubbed the ATS a “legal Lohengrin.”23 It is now a key federal statute in the transnational struggle to end impunity for
human rights violators.24 This overview of the historical devel21. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
22. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
23. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that
“no one seems to know whence it came”).
24. Other important federal laws are the Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)),
and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006)).
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opment of litigation under the ATS and its current scope under
Sosa contextualizes its role in federal motion practice today.
Understanding the relationship between subject-matter jurisdiction and stating a claim for relief is important to this Note’s
analysis of the plausibility standard in ATS litigation.
1. The Development of the ATS
In its current form, the ATS provides that “[t]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”25 Since its enactment by
the First Congress, the statute has not undergone major revision.26 Reading the amendments as superficial rather than
substantive,27 the Sosa Court interpreted the statute as a
product of the paradigms of the late eighteenth century.28
In practice, the ATS lay dormant in the U.S. Code for most
of its existence.29 A human rights lawsuit filed in 1979 on behalf of the Filártiga family of Paraguay revived the ATS.30 The
Second Circuit in 1980 allowed a civil claim for damages arising out of allegations of torture and extrajudicial killing of Joelito Filártiga by a Paraguayan police official who was a political
opponent of the young man’s father.31 In Filártiga, the court
recognized that the ATS provided jurisdiction to hear the
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
26. The minor, cosmetic changes were of two types. The first type of
change reflected the phraseological development of the federal rules. See William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 468 n.4 (1986)
(indicating that “causes” in the original Act was changed to “suits” then “civil
action”). The second change concerns the removal of explicit reference to concurrent state jurisdiction. Id. (noting that this does not eliminate state jurisdiction because the statute is not included in the section designating cases
over which federal jurisdiction is exclusive); see also BETH STEPHENS ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 120–27 (2d ed.
2008) (discussing state courts as a forum for human rights claims).
27. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713 n.10 (2004) (stating that the statute “has been
slightly modified on a number of occasions”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at
A124 (1947) (noting that “[c]hanges were made in phraseology”).
28. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 –25 (explicating the statute’s scope in relation to
piracy, safe conducts, and diplomatic injuries).
29. An April 26, 2011, Westlaw search for federal case citations to the statute in the nearly 200-year period before 1980 yielded twenty-two results. Westlaw search of “ALLFEDS” database using terms: [“28 u.s.c. § 1350” & da(bef
1980)] on April 26, 2011.
30. Complaint ¶ 4, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)
(No. 79 Civ. 917), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/diana/13june.asp.
31. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
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case.32 Although it indicated that analyzing ATS jurisdiction
required “a more searching preliminary review of the merits,”33
the court held that the plaintiffs had a cause of action for torture as a violation of universally recognized norms of customary international law.34
Following this watershed decision, the ATS received much
more judicial attention than at any time in its history.35 An important follow-up decision came four years later in Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic.36 A three-judge panel on the D.C. Circuit agreed that the district court had properly dismissed the
claim by a group of aliens for torture and other tortious conduct, but each judge wrote separately, unable to agree with
each other’s reasoning.37 Judge Edwards, in a widely regarded
opinion,38 approved of the Filártiga interpretation of the ATS
but distinguished the instant case on the facts.39 Judge Bork,
on the other hand, found the ATS to be solely jurisdictional in
nature such that “there [must] be an explicit grant of a cause of
action” for federal courts to be available.40 In the shortest of the
three opinions, Judge Robb argued that the case presented a
nonjusticiable political question.41
The Edwards-Bork debate signified the division of the major competing views of the ATS across the federal judiciary and
legal academy in the following years. Under the view generally
accepted following Filártiga, the ATS not only provided subjectmatter jurisdiction but also provided a cause of action for viola-

32. Id. at 887 n.22 (deciding specifically to rest federal subject-matter jurisdiction on the ATS rather than the federal question provision of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1993)).
33. Id. at 887.
34. Id. at 884 (using “customary international law” and “law of nations”
synonymously); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same).
35. Compare supra note 29 and accompanying text (using a search for
cases in the nearly 200-year period before 1980 to return twenty-two cases),
with a Westlaw search of “ALLFEDS” database using terms: [“28 u.s.c. § 1350”
& da(aft 1980)] on April 26, 2011 (using the same search for cases in the thirty-year period after 1980 to return 633 cases).
36. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
37. Id. at 775.
38. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (citing
Judge Edwards’s opinion with approval).
39. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791 (Edwards, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 801 (Bork, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).
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tions of the law of nations.42 Under the Borkian perspective,43
the ATS would be a simple jurisdictional statute with no force
unless Congress took further action to provide a statutory
cause of action.44 Most courts, however, largely were not persuaded by Judge Bork’s attack on Filártiga and continued to
hear and decide cases under the ATS.45 Over twenty years later, the Supreme Court responded to Judge Edwards’s request
in Tel-Oren for guidance46 by endorsing his opinion and the
Filártiga court’s use of this statute to hold modern human
rights violators accountable in Sosa.47
2. Sosa’s Historical Paradigm Test
Hearing a claim by a Mexican doctor that his arrest and
detention by U.S. citizens and law enforcement officials had
been arbitrary, the Court found that the ATS provides a limited
grant of subject-matter jurisdiction over federal common-law
causes of action.48 Weighing in on the broader debate, the Court
held that the ATS was “only jurisdictional,”49 while finding that
this jurisdictional grant incorporated causes of action compara42. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7–10, Sosa,
542 U.S.692 (No. 96-1890) (collecting cases); see also Harold Hongju Koh,
Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2383–88 (1991)
(discussing the grounds for implying a right of action under the ATS).
43. See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 205 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (referring favorably to Judge Bork’s approach in an opinion by future
Justice Scalia and with future Justice Ginsburg filing a separate concurrence);
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8118 (WHP), 2005 WL 1870811, at *1 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005), rev’d, 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 873 &
n.357 (1997).
44. Congress did just that with respect to torture and extrajudicial killings in the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106
Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)). Yet the legislative history in both
the Senate and the House shows a clear endorsement of the Filártiga view of the
ATS. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4 (1991); H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 86 (1991).
Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) supplement to the ATS to repudiate, rather than validate, Judge Bork’s opinion. Id.
45. See Coliver, Green & Hoffman, supra note 5, at 224 –26; Julian Ku,
The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A
Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 359 & nn.35–36
(2011) (stating that “Bork’s separation of powers critique never gained substantial currency outside the D.C. Circuit”).
46. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775 (Edwards, J., concurring) (“This case deals
with an area of the law that cries out for clarification by the Supreme Court.”).
47. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
48. Id. at 712.
49. Id.
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ble to those recognized at common law at the time of the 1789
enactment of the ATS.50 Thus, for a modern claim to be cognizable under the “law of nations” clause of the ATS, the Court
held that it must rest on an international norm that is universal and specifically defined.51
In defining this “historical paradigm test”52 for ATS jurisdiction, the court carved out a moderate position between the
two sides’ arguments. Dr. Alvarez-Machain presented the broad
view that the ATS simultaneously granted jurisdiction and conferred a new cause of action for violations of the law of nations.53 Yet, while the Court would not take this more expansive view, it dismissed the Borkian restrictive interpretation,
which would leave the ATS a dead letter.54 In this case, the
Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over this plaintiff’s
claim.55 Yet the Court provided the standard for recognizing
new causes of action for norms having no “less definite content
and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 [the ATS] was enacted.”56 Thus
the Court validated the cautious discretion employed by lower
courts to recognize other causes of action as international human rights norm evolve.57
The Sosa Court provided that the ATS is a federal jurisdictional statute incorporating existent international law.58 It is
50. Id. at 724 (giving as examples “Blackstone’s three primary offenses: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy”).
51. Id. at 725 (“[W]e think courts should require any claim based on the
present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the
features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”).
52. Paul Hoffman & Adrienne Quarry, The Alien Tort Statute: An Introduction for Civil Rights Lawyers, 2 L.A. PUB. INT. L.J. 129, 140 (2010), available
at http://www.lapilj.org/uploads/1/7/9/9/1799330/hoffman_-_converted.pdf (coining this term for Sosa’s analysis).
53. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713.
54. Id. at 719 (rejecting the view that “the ATS is a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a future Congress or state legislature”).
55. Id. at 738 (refusing to find a violation in “a single illegal detention of
less than a day”).
56. Id. at 732. The Court cited with approval the standards enunciated in
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980), Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring),
and In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467,
1475 (9th Cir. 1994). See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
57. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
58. Id. at 724 (“In sum, although the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action, the reasonable inference from the historical mate-
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not an unadorned, and thus “stillborn,” jurisdictional statute,59
but it does not automatically include all violations of customary
international law.60 What this jurisdictional statute does include is the common law of international torts at the time of its
enactment in the 1789 Judiciary Act.61 This definition of an
ATS norm under the historical paradigm test incorporates the
substantive norm, or cause of action, from international law
but looks to federal common law to determine whether there is
relief from the defendant’s specific conduct—that is, whether
there is a remedy.62 The Court’s decision clarified, to a great
degree, the role of international human rights norms in the
ATS and the discretion of lower courts to develop federal common law in this “interstitial area[] of particular federal interest.”63 However, courts have not always been clear about the
procedural distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction and
stating a claim for relief in the ATS context—an issue to which
this Note now turns.
3. ATS Jurisdiction and Stating an ATS Claim for Relief
The jurisdiction-merits distinction is fundamental in federal civil procedure.64 It is found in the organization of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.65 A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to disrials is that the statute was intended to have practical effect the moment it
became law.”).
59. Id. at 714 (referring to Sosa’s arguments).
60. Id. at 713 (noting Alvarez-Machain’s view of the ATS).
61. Id. at 724 (“The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been
enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of
action for the modest number of international law violations with a potential
for personal liability at the time.”).
62. One commentator argues that a cause of action under Sosa is a “hybrid” or “mixed” cause of action since it at once relies on international law and
federal common law. William R. Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort
Remedies for Violations of International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 638–44
(2006).
63. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440
U.S. 715, 726–27 (1979)).
64. Although using the term “merits” to stand in for “stating a claim upon
which relief may be granted” elides important distinctions in those concepts,
such distinctions are not key to my analysis, which instead focuses on the distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction and stating a claim. For ease in
this Note, I refer to a jurisdiction-merits distinction where the Supreme Court
has employed the phrase “the subject-matter jurisdiction/ingredient-of-claimfor-relief dichotomy.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006).
65. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction”), and FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)
(providing the defense of “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction”), with FED.
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miss on jurisdictional grounds is “analytically different” from a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.66
Wright and Miller describe the former as “flexible, often serving as a procedural vehicle for raising various residual defenses,”67 but failure to state a claim is not among such defenses.68 The Supreme Court on numerous occasions has
upheld and reiterated this distinction.69 Further, the Steel
Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment rule requires
that subject-matter jurisdictional issues be determined fully before considering a claim’s merit.70 In the ATS context, commentators have highlighted the need for courts to rigorously police
this distinction for analytical soundness.71
In spite of this general view, courts hearing motions to
dismiss ATS cases often are unclear about which of the two motions they are considering.72 Some courts review the motion

R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief ”), and FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (providing
the defense of “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”).
66. E.g., 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1350, at 106 (3d ed. 2004) (“[T]he former determines whether the plaintiff has a right to be in the particular court and the latter is an adjudication as to whether a cognizable legal claim has been stated.”).
67. See id. § 1350 passim (listing the defenses of mootness, political question, and others).
68. See id. §§ 1355–1357 (discussing separately the Rule 12(b)(6) motion).
69. 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (“It is firmly established in our cases that the
absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate
subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate the case.”); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (“Jurisdiction,
therefore, is not defeated as respondents seem to contend, by the possibility
that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners
could actually recover. For it is well settled that the failure to state a proper
cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for
want of jurisdiction.”).
70. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94 (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
506, 514 (1869)); see also Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?,
95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1214 –16 (2001) (considering the Court’s “jurisdictionfirst” rule, but noting some exceptions).
71. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 26, at 29–31 (disputing Filártiga’s
statement that ATS cases require “more searching preliminary review of the
merits” at the jurisdictional stage based on the jurisdiction-merits distinction);
see also Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Substantiality, 42
TULSA L. REV. 579, 580–84 (2007) (discussing the conflation of jurisdiction and
merits under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993) “arising-under” jurisdiction).
72. Even the Sosa Court never explicitly stated whether it was dismissing
the claims based on lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim for relief.
See Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1006 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (analyzing Sosa).
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strictly on jurisdictional grounds,73 while others discuss it in
terms of stating a claim,74 and still others discuss jurisdiction
as a function of the claim stated.75 Additionally, courts generally do not appear to be mindful of this distinction or whether it
matters to their analysis.76 Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., an opinion
from the Southern District of Indiana, stands in contrast because it directly addressed this issue, adequately balancing the
necessities of general procedural doctrine with the dictates of
Sosa in ATS context.77
In Bridgestone Corp., the court confronted allegations of
forced labor of both adults and children on a Liberian rubber
plantation.78 In response to defendants’ motion to dismiss for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the court enunciated the
historical paradigm test and noted that plaintiffs need only allege “colorable and arguable” violations—rather than a completely proven violation—of the law of nations to sustain subject-matter jurisdiction.79 The court further emphasized the
jurisdiction-merits distinction by rejecting defendants’ attempt
to incorporate a “higher standard” for ATS jurisdiction from the
Filártiga and Kadic v. Karadzic cases.80 The court rightly fol73. See, e.g., In re Sinaltrainal Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1301 (S.D.
Fla. 2006) (dismissing for failure to state a claim).
74. See, e.g., Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir.
2009) (affirming the lower court, which had dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, but characterizing the dismissal as jurisdictional); Wiwa
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 377, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (distinguishing between a jurisdictional challenge and merits-related questions
that are irrelevant at the jurisdictional stage).
75. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2009)
(stating that the district court had dismissed the case “based on its determination that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs failed to state
claims under the ATS”); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254,
309–10 (2d Cir. 2007) (Korma, J., concurring); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp.,
414 F.3d 233, 255 n.30 (2d Cir. 2003).
76. But see, e.g., Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 588 F.
Supp. 2d 375, 379 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that whether the motion is on
jurisdiction or failure to state a claim is a “very substantial issue,” but declining to distinguish which type it is because the parties “skirted” the issue).
77. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1006.
78. Id. at 990.
79. Id. at 1004; cf. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006) (stating that § 1331 arising-under jurisdiction requires a plaintiff to plead “a colorable claim” for relief (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681–85 (1946))).
80. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1004 –05 (“[I]t is not a sufficient
basis for jurisdiction to plead merely a colorable violation of the law of nations.
There is no federal subject-matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Act unless
the complaint adequately pleads a violation of the law of nations (or treaty of the
United States).” (quoting Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995))).
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lowed those courts that do not conflate jurisdiction and stating
a claim, and it acknowledged that a heightened pleading standard at the jurisdictional stage is not acceptable after Sosa.81
One final note on ATS jurisdiction relates to the two types
of challenges on motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Some pre-Sosa courts distinguished between facial
and factual motions to challenge a claim on jurisdictional
grounds.82 A facial challenge is a direct challenge to the legal
sufficiency of the claim.83 In such a motion, a court accepts as
true all the allegations of the complaint and considers only that
which is contained within the four corners of the complaint.84 A
defendant who challenges the jurisdictional allegations themselves presents a factual challenge.85 In such a case, a court
will not consider the complaint presumptively truthful but will
weigh the defendant’s evidence against the allegations of the
plaintiff, who has the burden of proving jurisdiction.86 Under a
factual challenge, courts look to extrinsic evidence to determine
whether the jurisdictional facts present a case that the courts
have the power to adjudicate.87 Although a Rule 12(b)(1) facial
attack and a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge to the claim have similar
procedural requirements,88 this similarity does not dictate the
wholesale importation of the Rule 12(b)(6) standard into the
81. Id. at 1005–06; see also Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 697 F. Supp.
2d 674, 686–87 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (citing the Bridgestone Corp. case and following this approach to distinguish the jurisdiction issue from the pleadings issue); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d
289, 307–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (questioning the higher standard of review).
82. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1129–30 (C.D.
Cal. 2002) (distinguishing the two types of challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 437–38 (D.N.J. 1999)
(making the same distinction between factual and facial attacks of subjectmatter jurisdiction). The Eleventh Circuit has also recently taken the same approach. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009).
83. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 438.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 255 n.30 (2d Cir.
2003) (allowing consideration of materials outside of the pleadings when addressing a factual challenge); Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1129; see also
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 26, at 452 (discussing the role of factual material
in pleading ATS cases).
88. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009)
(“As it does when considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a
court considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accepts
all well-pled facts alleged in the complaint as true.”).
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Rule 12(b)(1) context. A court credits as true the complaint’s allegations in a facial attack because it is limited to those averments, and the plaintiff ’s burden in proving jurisdiction is mitigated by the presumption of truthfulness of the plaintiff’s
allegations. Beyond these superficial similarities, the analytical
difference between jurisdiction and merits requires that the
standards of review remain distinct,89 a point to which this
Note will return later.
In sum, courts are not always clear whether they are examining a challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1), which requires the complaint to satisfy the historical
paradigm test of Sosa, or a challenge to the sufficiency of the
claim under Rule 12(b)(6), which has an entirely different standard of review. That standard of review derives from Twombly
and Iqbal and is considered in the next section on pleading
standards. A general understanding of plausibility pleading allows for an analysis of these specific pleading issues as they
impact ATS lawsuits.
B. FEDERAL PLEADING STANDARDS: FROM 1938 TO THE
PRESENT
The Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of Rule 8’s
pleading requirements in Rule 12 motion practice has important implications on ATS litigation. The simplified, notice
pleading standard governing all civil claims since the inception
of the Federal Rules is no longer current. The duo of Twombly
and Iqbal repudiated that standard by creating a more stringent test of a complaint’s sufficiency in stating a claim for relief, which may be fatal to a number of valid claims.90 This section discusses the development of federal pleading standards in
order to provide background for an analysis of pleading requirements in human rights claims under the ATS.
Prior to 1938, litigation in the United States proceeded under a system of code pleading.91 To bring a claim before the
courts, a claimant had to list the “dry, naked, actual facts” of
her case in a prescribed pattern, carefully avoiding any refer-

89. See supra notes 64–71 and accompanying text.
90. See Brief of National Civil Rights Organizations, supra note 19, at 10–
11 (citing examples of how even plaintiffs with valid claims may find it nearly
impossible to survive the Iqbal pleading standard).
91. Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV.
987, 990 (2003); see also CHARLES E. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 22 (2d ed. 1947).
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ence to laws or legal standards.92 Elaborate rules developed,
based on the assumption “that statements of fact and conclusions of law could be sharply distinguished.”93 Being “widely
criticized for overemphasizing form over substance,”94 the legal
realist critique of the early twentieth century ended this formalistic method of pleading.95 In its stead, a simplified and liberal
model of pleadings allowed greater access to the courts.96
The Supreme Court promulgated these simplified pleading
requirements,97 which came to be known as “notice pleading,”98
at Rule 8(a)(2) of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.99
Rule 8(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to provide “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”100 The rule mentioned neither facts nor law and, thus,
reflected a policy decision that required very little of the claimant to open the doors to the federal courthouse.101 This uniform
pleading model had four distinct functions,102 of which the primary function was notice, according to the Supreme Court in

92. Bone, supra note 12, at 863 (quoting JOHN NORTON POMEROY, CODE
REMEDIES 560–61 (4th ed. 1904)).
93. Id.
94. Fairman, supra note 91, at 990.
95. One realist scholar, for example, found “no logical difference between
permissible factual allegations and impermissible legal conclusions.” Bone,
supra note 12, at 864 (citing Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in
Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 416, 417 (1921)).
96. See Fairman, supra note 91, at 990 (noting how the adoption of the
federal rules ensured that litigants would “have their day in court” and created a
“new procedural system that massively de-emphasize[d] the role of pleadings”).
97. The Rules Enabling Act vests this authority in the Court. See Rules
Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2074 (2006)).
98. A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 434
(2008).
99. Another rule, 9(b), heightens the pleading standard for fraud and mistake by requiring a party to state such allegations “with particularity.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 9(b). Application of this rule is generally not problematic, see Clermont
& Yeazell, supra note 18, at 854 (referring to “seventy years of [judicial] interpretation of the ‘particularity’ requirement”), and it is not at issue in this Note.
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
101. See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of
Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 875–76 (2009) (discussing the policy arguments underlying pleading standards).
102. See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202, at 87 (3d ed. 2004) (describing the four
functions of pleading as providing notice to the parties, giving some facts, narrowing the issues for litigation, and quickly and easily disposing of sham
claims or defenses).
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Conley v. Gibson.103 A complaint was only dismissed on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion if “it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts” to support a claim for relief.104 The
Conley notice pleading regime, arising from the liberal policy
choice of the federal rules, lasted for fifty years.
Before the Court’s major overhaul of this precedent in
2007, the Court had two occasions to consider the role in the
federal system of “heightened” pleading standards.105 First, in
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, the Court acknowledged the competing policy
arguments of plaintiffs, who seek a broad right of access to
courts, and official defendants, who desire protection from suits
that may be distracting or harmful to the public interest.106 It
ultimately stated that summary judgment and controlled discovery must supply the requisite protections unless the federal
rules are amended to rebalance the policy goals.107 Next, in
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., the Court found that the simple
allegations in petitioner’s claim were sufficient under “Rule
8(a)’s simplified notice pleading standard,” and again deferred
any statement on the defendant’s policy arguments to the established rules amendment process.108
In this fairly settled area of the law,109 the Supreme
Court’s decision in Twombly abrogated a single phrase of the
Conley decision,110 overruled no precedent,111 and purported not

103. 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (requiring the complaint to give “fair notice” of
the claim to allow a defendant to prepare an adequate defense).
104. Id. at 45–46.
105. See generally Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 1293 (2010) (discussing the cases analyzing pleading standards leading
up to Twombly).
106. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166–68 (1993).
107. Id. at 168.
108. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513–15 (2002).
109. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 573 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (describing the majority’s holding as a “dramatic departure from
settled procedural law”).
110. Id. at 562–63 (majority opinion) (giving “Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language” its “retirement”); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007)
(discussing Rule 8(a)(2)’s “liberal pleading standard” and citing with approval
Conley’s “fair notice” requirement, indicating that the remainder of the Conley
decision remains intact).
111. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547 (noting that the Court’s current analysis “does not run counter to Swierkiewicz”).
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to heighten pleading standards.112 The plaintiff based his
Sherman Act113 allegations on evidence of “parallel conduct,”114
which could have occurred by coincidence rather than illicit
agreement.115 Announcing a new rubric of “plausibility,”116 the
Court required that a claim present “enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.”117 In
light of the potentially massive expense of discovery to defendants,118 the Court held that a claim must do more than give fair
notice and leave “open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some ‘set of [undisclosed] facts.’”119 A complaint
must rise “above the speculative level”120 and make a factual
“‘showing’” of the grounds for relief.121 Finding that “the plaintiffs here [had] not nudged their claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible,” the Court dismissed the claim.122
Following Twombly, courts and commentators attempted
to reconcile the Supreme Court’s decision with the federal rules
and the precedent interpreting them.123 The main question in
this interim period was whether the plausibility standard
would be limited to antitrust claims,124 be limited to cases that

112. Id. at 569 n.14 (“In reaching this conclusion, we do not apply any
‘heightened’ pleading standard . . . .”).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
114. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550.
115. Id. at 557.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 556.
118. Id. at 558.
119. Id. at 561 (alteration in original) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
45 (1957)).
120. Id. at 555.
121. Id. at 556 n.3 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
122. Id. at 570.
123. See, e.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting
“a universal standard of heightened fact pleading” despite receiving “conflicting signals” from the Supreme Court, and instead favoring “a flexible ‘plausibility standard’”), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 604 –06 (2006) (discussing various
pleading standards following Twombly’s holding); A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009) (attempting to
create a holistic theory of pleading).
124. See Bone, supra note 101, at 882–90 (discussing the “modest” impact
of the decision).
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bore structural similarities to antitrust claims,125 or apply to
every civil suit.126 The answer came shortly thereafter in Iqbal:
“plausibility” is inherent in Rule 8(a)(2)’s “showing” requirement and thus applies to “‘all civil actions’” under the Rules.127
The plaintiff Javaid Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim, was arrested for immigration infractions soon after the events of September 11, 2001.128 Federal law enforcement officials classified
him as “of high interest” and moved him and many others so
designated to a special detention center where he underwent
unnecessary and degrading treatment on account of his race or
religion in violation of his constitutional rights.129 The Supreme
Court upheld the dismissal of his complaint against John Ashcroft and Robert Mueller, which alleged that they had designed
and implemented the policy that led to these violations.130 The
Court explained the “two working principles” of pleadings from
Twombly: (1) a court must accept all “factual allegations” as
true, but need not credit “legal conclusions,” and (2) only a
“plausible” claim for relief is sufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.131 Operating under those
principles, the Court used a two-pronged analysis to determine
the sufficiency of the claim. First, the allegations that were not
entitled to a presumption of truth (the “legal conclusions”) were
excised from the statement of the claim.132 Here, the Court determined the allegation that the policy of detaining Muslims
and Arabs such as Mr. Iqbal indicated a discriminatory intent
on account of race or religion was a legal conclusion because it
was “nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’”
of the claim.133 Second, the remaining factual allegations were
reviewed to determine whether they “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.”134 Because the Court had eliminated the
key allegation of discriminatory intent, the Court deemed the
125. See Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to
Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
61, 99 (2007) (finding Twombly’s holding useful in a small subset of cases).
126. See Spencer, supra note 20, at 103 (analyzing the effects of Twombly
on civil rights litigation).
127. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
128. Id. at 1942.
129. Id. at 1943–44.
130. Id. at 1944.
131. Id. at 1949–50.
132. Id. at 1951.
133. Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
134. Id.
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blue-penciled complaint insufficient and dismissed the case
against these two defendants.135
The Supreme Court’s requirements for pleadings drastically changed in appearance in a short period of time. Although
the Court purported to make minimal changes in response to
important policy issues, the ramifications of its holdings on a
vast array of substantive areas of law remain to be seen. Moving into the arena of human rights litigation, these developments have begun to impact the arguments of litigants and decisions of courts on plausibly pleading claims for human rights
violations. The next Part reviews this impact by discussing the
role of the plausibility standard in ATS cases across federal jurisdictions.
II. PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING IN THE ATS CONTEXT:NEW
STANDARD OR NEW TERMINOLOGY?
Many scholars have emphasized the radical or revolutionary nature of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions in the previously settled area of pleading practices.136 The publication of articles about how to plausibly plead certain legal doctrines or
claims is further indication that scholars believe the introduction of a pleading standard based on plausibility has changed
the previous requirements necessary to make a case.137 Empiricists also are publishing evaluations of the meaning and effect
of plausibility pleading on various areas of the law.138 This Part
considers the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on federal courts’
analyses of motions to dismiss ATS claims. A review of these
human rights cases to which district and circuit courts have
applied a plausibility analysis reveals the beginnings of trends
135. Id. at 1952. The Supreme Court remanded to the Second Circuit, id. at
1954, which then remanded to the district court to determine whether respondent can “seek leave to amend his deficient complaint.” Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 574
F.3d 820, 821 (2d Cir. 2009).
136. See, e.g., Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 18, at 823 (“The Court has
revolutionized the law of pleading . . . . [T]hey have destabilized the entire system of civil litigation.”).
137. See, e.g., Jayne S. Ressler, Plausibly Pleading Personal Jurisdiction,
82 TEMP. L. REV. 627 (2009); Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613 (2011).
138. See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly
and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556–57 (2010) (finding
statistically significant increases in dismissals on Rule 12(b)(6) motions following Twombly and Iqbal, especially in constitutional civil rights cases). For an
early, nonempirical but comprehensive survey of pleadings in civil rights
claims following Twombly, see generally Spencer, supra note 20.
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in application.139 One generally applicable trend is clear. In
most courts’ boilerplate exposition of the legal standard on a
motion to dismiss, quotations from Twombly and Iqbal have
replaced most references to Conley.140 Whether the new incantations in ATS suits represent a paradigm shift in pleadings141
or simply new terminology for a gradual trend142 is the focus of
this analysis.
This Part proceeds in three sections. The first focuses on
the role of plausibility pleading in the courts of the Second Circuit, the circuit that first dealt with both Twombly143 and Iqbal.144 The second section focuses on the Eleventh Circuit’s
method and those courts that have followed it. The comparison
of these two methods will show that plausibility pleading is neither consistently applied nor as detrimental to human rights
litigation as it could be, except in a few initial cases from the
Eleventh Circuit. The third section discusses various types of
factual allegations and their relationship to the standard required by Twombly-Iqbal. This Part shows that the TwomblyIqbal standard should apply only to Rule 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, and not to Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Courts
139. To show the scope of this analysis, a Westlaw search of ALLFEDS for
[“alien tort” & iqbal OR twombly] on April 26, 2011 yielded eighty results, not
all of which actually applied the pleading standards to human rights claims.
Note that these numbers are merely contextual and not empirical analysis.
140. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d
Cir. 2010) (citing to the language of Twombly and Iqbal in setting forth the
standard of review for motion to dismiss decisions); id. at 191 (Leval, J., concurring) (echoing, again, the Twombly and Iqbal standards). Before Twombly’s
2007 decision, 65 cases out of 382 ATS cases cited Conley. The number of ATS
cases citing Conley drops to only 8 out of 225 after 2007. Compare Westlaw
searches of ALLFEDS for [“conley v. gibson” & “alien tort” & da(bef 2007)] and
[“alien tort” & da(bef 2007)] on April 26, 2011 (finding that 65 out of 382 ATS
cases cited Conley), with Westlaw searches of ALLFEDS for [“conley v. gibson”
& “alien tort” & da(aft 2007)] and [“alien tort” & da(aft 2007)] on April 26,
2011 (finding 8 out of 225 ATS cases cited Conley).
141. See JOSHUA CIVIN & DEBO P. ADEGBILE, RESTORING ACCESS TO
JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF IQBAL AND TWOMBLY ON THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS
LITIGATION 2 (2010), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Civin%20and%
20Adegbile%20issue%20brief%20final%20(9-14 -10).pdf (urging legislative action to reverse the “detrimental impact” of the pleadings decisions).
142. See generally Fairman, supra note 91 (describing the gradual progression of heightened pleading over the years).
143. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
144. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 WL 2375202
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490
F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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must properly characterize motions to dismiss as challenging
either subject-matter jurisdiction or the factual sufficiency of
the claim so that they may apply Sosa to the former and
Twombly-Iqbal to the latter.
A. PLAUSIBILITY IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
The Second Circuit first breathed new life into the modern
ATS with the 1980 Filártiga decision, and it continues to face
many important issues regarding the ATS’s scope.145 Applying
Sosa to novel factual scenarios, the Second Circuit and some
district courts in the circuit recently have upheld claims recognizing modern human rights violations as adequate under the
historical paradigm test.146 Courts in this circuit have also been
grappling with the relevance of the new pleading standard in
analyzing disputed substantive issues such as aiding and abetting liability and the state action requirement.147 This subpart
focuses on those Second Circuit cases’ interpretation and application of the Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard.
In hearing motions to dismiss ATS cases, courts in the
Second Circuit now cite Twombly or Iqbal (or both) for the
standard of review for a Rule12(b)(6) motion.148 Yet a closer
look at these decisions reveals that the courts do not always
implement Iqbal’s two-pronged approach of ignoring all “conclusory” allegations or legal conclusions and testing the remaining factual allegations for sufficient plausibility.149 For example, in Kiobel, Judge Leval’s concurrence began its review of the
adequacy of the pleading of aiding and abetting liability for a
variety of international norms by reciting the plausibility standard.150 Judge Leval then considered the general and the specific
acts alleged in the complaint to constitute aiding and abetting,
145. See, e.g., Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 120 (discussing the notion of corporate
liability for international crimes).
146. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2009)
(holding that the prohibition of nonconsensual medical experimentation is a
“customary international law norm” sufficient to confer a cause of action under
the ATS).
147. See, e.g., Lev v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 08 CV 3251(NG)(VVP), 2010 WL
623636, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010) (analyzing a motion to dismiss in the
context of a claim of aiding and abetting terrorism by a bank); Almog v. Arab
Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 271–72 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (following the examples of Sosa and Filártiga in deciding whether to recognize a claim under the
ATS for aiding and abetting terrorism by a bank).
148. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123–24; id. at 191 (Leval, J., concurring).
149. See supra notes 131–36 and accompanying text.
150. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 191.
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but he never applied the first prong to strike out any of the allegations or to find some worthy of the presumption of truthfulness and others unworthy.151 He did not move to an application of prong two to consider the legal sufficiency of any
remaining allegations that are presumed true. Rather, this
concurrence presumed all of the general allegations and specific
actions to be true but found they were “legally insufficient” for
aiding and abetting liability “because they [did] not support a
reasonable inference that Shell provided substantial assistance
to the Nigerian government with a purpose to advance or facilitate the Nigerian government’s violations.”152 That reasoning is
an application of the Second Circuit’s purpose standard for aiding and abetting liability.153 The veneer of plausibility language
does not make this a strict application of Iqbal. The concurrence stated that, by “[p]utting together these two rules [from
Iqbal and Talisman],” the complaint must be dismissed.154 In
this opinion, the application of the Talisman purpose rule was
most dispositive while the Iqbal plausibility rule provided
merely the framework. Judge Leval’s use of the Iqbal standard
relied on his judicial “common sense,” rather than a rigid application of that precedent’s steps.155 In Lev v. Arab Bank, PLC,
the district court took the same tack with respect to the pleadings to allow the claim of aiding and abetting terrorist attacks
to proceed.156 The court quoted language from Iqbal on the
plausibility standard and cited both Twombly and Iqbal,157 but
it then credited all factual allegations as true and distinguished
the case at bar from Talisman.158 Again, the Iqbal standard
provided merely the terminology with which the court undertook the Talisman legal analysis.
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. represents a similar, but pre-Iqbal,
analysis on the legal issue of the state action requirement.159
The Second Circuit cited Twombly and its decision in Iqbal v.
151. Id. at 191–93.
152. Id. at 192.
153. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d
244, 247 (2d Cir. 2009).
154. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 154.
155. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
156. Lev v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 08 CV 3251(NG)(VVP), 2010 WL 623636,
at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010) (stating that Twombly and Iqbal “do not require
the repeated incantation of key words” to survive a motion to dismiss).
157. Id. at *1.
158. Id. at *2–3.
159. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009).
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Hasty for the plausibility standard of review.160 In the analysis,
however, all allegations were presumed true and the majority
found them adequate “[a]t the pleading stage.”161 The dissent
took issue with one “conclusory” allegation, but the thrust of
the dissent’s argument hinged on the legal issue of “consent” in
the medical experiments and whether the alleged state actions
satisfied the legal meaning of “decisive step” under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 jurisprudence.162 The debate between majority and dissent focused more on whether the allegations satisfied the legal
standard for state action than on whether to presume the allegations were true or to remove them from the legal analysis of
the claim’s sufficiency.163 Similarly, a 2008 district court decision quoted the Twombly pleading standard but decided the
case on the mens rea element for aiding and abetting liability.164
Second Circuit cases, and those courts around the country
that have followed suit, have retained a liberal view of pleading
standards even within the rubric of the Twombly-Iqbal plausibility standard.165 These courts have incorporated the lexicon of
Twombly and Iqbal, and they are conversant in those precedents and their “common sense” function.166 In spite of those
decisions, however, these courts tend to analyze ATS claims
and defenses on the more nuanced legal debates in the
field167—for example, the purpose standard for aiding and abetting liability or the state action requirement for certain international law violations. This may not be surprising since courts
in this circuit first dealt with the Twombly and Iqbal cases and
in light of the circuit’s decision in Iqbal v. Hasty, which more
liberally applied Twombly than the Supreme Court did on those

160. Id. at 172 n.6.
161. Id. at 188–89.
162. Id. at 210–12 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 188–89 (majority opinion); id. at 211 (Wesley, J., dissenting); see
also Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 97 Civ. 2858(BSJ), 2010 WL 3377503, at *7–8
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2010); Estate of Manook v. Research Triangle Inst., Int’l,
Nos. 5:10-CV-72-D, 5:10-CV-73-D, 2010 WL 3199874, at *3–4 (E.D.N.C. Aug.
12, 2010).
164. Mastafa v. Austl. Wheat Bd. Ltd., No. 07 Civ. 7955(GEL), 2008 WL
4378443, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2008).
165. See, e.g., Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 681–82
(S.D. Tex. 2009).
166. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
167. See, e.g., Adhikari, 697 F. Supp. 2d at 685–88.
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facts.168 Although the language of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion has
changed, the courts remain focused on the broader ATS questions in the circuit.
In addition to the more liberal view of Twombly-Iqbal, the
Second Circuit’s motion analyses have been clear about the difference in type and standard of view between Rule 12(b)(1) motions and Rule 12(b)(6) motions. In cases such as Kiobel, the
Second Circuit neither conflated jurisdiction and stating a
claim, nor applied a more stringent standard of review.169 The
court, like many post-Iqbal courts, used boilerplate language
from Twombly and Iqbal rather than Conley to provide the new
terminology of the standard.170 Yet their application of plausibility is not a heightening of the requirements at the motion to
dismiss stage. The Second Circuit has incorporated the Supreme Court’s pleading standard in a limited and focused manner. These courts have applied it appropriately to only Rule
12(b)(6) motions and have discussed it usefully in the context of
the broader substantive questions at issue.171 As the next subpart reveals, the courts of the Eleventh Circuit have not followed this focused approach to plausibility pleading in human
rights cases.
B. PLAUSIBILITY IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
As the preceding section shows, the plausibility standard
has yet to make waves in the Second Circuit. A few recent cases
in the Eleventh Circuit, however, reveal more noticeable effects
of Twombly and Iqbal. Unlike the Second Circuit, the Eleventh
Circuit had some tendency toward a heightening of pleading
requirements in the ATS. Whether these initial cases reflect a
broader ongoing trend is not clear.172 Yet, some cases in the circuit have implemented the plausibility decisions in a manner
168. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937.
169. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 –25 (2d
Cir. 2010).
170. See id. at 123–24; id. at 191–93 (Leval, J., concurring).
171. See Rosaleen T. O’Gara, Note, Procedural Dismissals Under the Alien
Tort Statute, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 797, 820–22 (2010) (arguing that courts should
tackle substantive issues directly instead of dismissing ATS cases on procedural grounds).
172. But see Estate of Amergi ex rel. Amergi v. Palestinian Authority, 611
F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2010), for an Eleventh Circuit decision that properly reviewed a jurisdictional motion to dismiss an ATS claim without reference
to Iqbal.
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that heightens the pleading standard without being explicit
about this goal or approach.
The leading Eleventh Circuit decision applying a plausibility standard of review to ATS claims is Sinaltrainal v. CocaCola Co.173 The court described its standard of review in the
terms of Twombly and Iqbal,174 and it stated that a Rule
12(b)(1) facial challenge to jurisdiction has the same safeguards
and standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge to the sufficiency of
the claim.175 The court, then, moved to the two-pronged analysis of Iqbal and rejected those allegations in the complaint it
found “conclusory” or implausible.176 With constant reference to
plausibility, the court rejected plaintiffs’ allegations of state action, of conspiracy, of torture, and of war crimes.177 With little
left in the complaint to construe favorably to the plaintiffs,178
the court dismissed the ATS and TVPA claims.179 In so doing,
the court made precise, if inaccurate, decisions regarding jurisdiction and stating a claim for relief. The court applied the
same Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility analysis to both ATS and TVPA
claims.180 Yet, it characterized the ATS dismissal as one for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and the TVPA dismissal as a
failure to state a plausible claim for relief.181
To understand this development in the Eleventh Circuit,
the broader context of ATS motion practice in its courts is instructive. In the district court’s pre-Twombly decision in Sinaltrainal, the court faced “difficult” questions of law and fact.182
In determining ATS jurisdiction and whether the complaint
stated a claim, the court conflated the jurisdiction and suffi-

173. 578 F.3d 1252, 1260–61, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009).
174. Id. at 1260–61, 1265 n.14 (avoiding explicitly the issue of a “heightened pleading standard”).
175. Id. at 1260.
176. Id. at 1266–68. But cf. Michael Eaton, Note, The Key to the Courthouse
Door: The Effect of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and the Heightened Pleading Standard,
51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 299, 321–23 (2011) (arguing that the Eleventh Circuit did not adequately apply the first prong of the Iqbal analysis and simply
jumped to the second prong).
177. Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1266–68.
178. See id. at 1260.
179. Id. at 1269–70.
180. Compare id. at 1266–69 (ATS claims), with id. at 1269–70 (TVPA claims).
181. Id. at 1270.
182. In re Sinaltrainal Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1275 (S.D. Fla. 2006),
aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578
F.3d 1252.
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ciency of the claim.183 It then proceeded to apply an explicitly
“heightened pleading standard” to the issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction.184 The court applied a heightened Rule 12(b)(6)
standard to a jurisdictional issue in the ATS and TVPA—erring
as to both the type of motion and the standard of review.
In spite of the Supreme Court disfavoring heightened
pleading standards,185 the Eleventh circuit, like a number of
courts, has used a heightened standard in some contexts.186
The Sinaltrainal district court examined and relied on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Aldana v. Del Monte Produce, Inc. to
disregard “conclusory” allegations.187 Notably, the Aldana decision, which validated this rejection of conclusory allegations,
does not consider its approach to pleading to be heightened.188
While the district court in Aldana,189 just like the district court
in Sinaltrainal,190 had taken a heightened approach to pleading
requirements, the Eleventh Circuit refused to consider this approach heightened in either case.191 The Eleventh Circuit applied Iqbal in its move toward stricter pleading standards in
this particular ATS case.192
These developments contrast with ATS cases in the Second
Circuit, where plausibility pleading has had relatively minimal
impact on the disposition of motions to dismiss.193 The Eleventh
Circuit has relied heavily on Twombly and Iqbal to analyze motions to dismiss ATS cases.194 Commentators lamenting the
183. Id. at 1284 (“Arguably, the distinction between the 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) standards may be somewhat blurred in the context of an ATCA case.”).
184. Id. at 1286–87 (“[I]t is appropriate to require some heightened pleading standard when determining whether the complaints in the instant cases
sufficiently plead facts showing that Defendants violated the law of nations.”).
185. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569–70 (2007).
186. See Fairman, supra note 91, at 1059.
187. In re Sinaltrainal, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1284 (citing Aldana v. Del
Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1253 (11th Cir. 2005)).
188. See Aldana, 416 F.3d at 1253.
189. Villeda Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d
1285, 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2003), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Aldana v.
Del. Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005).
190. In re Sinaltrainal, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
191. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1265 n.14 (11th Cir.
2009); Aldana, 416 F.3d at 1253 (stating that “some minimal pleading standard does still exist”).
192. A number of courts have followed this model. See, e.g., In re XE Servs.
Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569, 589 (E.D. Va. 2009).
193. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 191–93
(2d Cir. 2010).
194. See, e.g., Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1260–61.
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harsh effects on plaintiffs of plausibility pleadings195 need not
look further than the Eleventh Circuit’s ATS decisions. However, a review of the substantive law that the Eleventh Circuit
has applied in the ATS context may explain this divergence
from the Second Circuit.
On a number of ATS issues,196 the Eleventh Circuit standards are more favorable to plaintiffs than those of the Second
Circuit. Apparently, the strictness of pleading requirements is
inversely related to the strictness of substantive legal requirements for bringing an ATS case. That is, the use of strict pleading requirements ratchets up the difficulty in bringing an ATS
case where the substantive legal requirements are more permissive (Eleventh Circuit), whereas a more stringent legal
standard on the substantive issues obviates the necessity of
heightened pleading requirements (Second Circuit). Further,
this reliance on procedural mechanisms to dismiss hard cases
gives an unwarranted reason to sidestep the pressing substantive issues in ATS litigation today.197 In addition to ignoring
Sosa’s delegation of discretion to the lower federal courts, this
Eleventh Circuit method highlights many courts’ misunderstandings about ATS jurisdiction and stating an ATS claim.
As exemplified by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Sinaltrainal,198 many courts make two fundamental errors when
considering plausibility pleading in human rights cases. The
first is to conflate the question of jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1) with that of the sufficiency of a claim under Rule
12(b)(6).199 The second follows from the first: courts apply the
standard of review of the latter in analyzing the former.200 The
courts of the Eleventh Circuit directly reviewed the tough question of ATS jurisdiction,201 unlike the many courts which have
glossed over the issue.202 However, the conclusion by the circuit
195. See, e.g., CIVIN & ADEGBILE, supra note 141, at 1.
196. See, e.g., Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1263 (allowing corporate liability);
Cabello v. Fernández-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1158 (11th Cir. 2005) (requiring a
mens rea of knowledge, not purpose, for aiding and abetting liability).
197. O’Gara, supra note 171, at 820.
198. Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1268–69.
199. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2009).
200. See, e.g., In re Sinaltrainal Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1301 (S.D.
Fla. 2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola
Co., 578 F.3d 1252.
201. See, e.g., Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1266; In re Sinaltrainal, 474 F.
Supp. 2d at 1275.
202. See, e.g., Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 588 F. Supp.
2d 375, 378–80 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
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court that “fail[ing] to state a plausible claim for relief” supports dismissal “for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction”203
misses the point of Sosa. As the Bridgestone opinion made
clear, conflating these two analytically distinct issues is not a
sound method to determine the viability of an ATS claim.204
The power to speak the law of a particular issue is not the same
as whether a particular set of facts implicates the need for a
remedy under specified legal rights. The former necessarily
precedes the latter, and a federal court cannot consider the latter if the former is lacking.205 Further, the Eleventh Circuit’s
factual-facial distinction does not compel its result. Although
the procedural assurances of a facial challenge to jurisdiction
bear some similarities to Rule 12(b)(6) motions, that fact alone
does not open the door to a review of the merits of a claim at
the jurisdictional stage.206
Contrary to the view of the Sinaltrainal court, Sosa did not
conflate jurisdiction and merits in devising the historical paradigm test.207 To determine ATS jurisdiction, it did not require a
plausible claim under the law of nations; it demanded that the
expression of the law of nations on a violation be “specific, universal, and obligatory.”208 This legal question precedes the determination that a fact scenario plausibly implicates that international norm. Thus, to the extent that Iqbal’s plausibility
analysis applies in ATS suits, it does not apply to jurisdictional
motions to dismiss an ATS—or any other—suit.209
203. Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1269.
204. See Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1004 –06 (S.D.
Ind. 2007).
205. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998).
206. See id.; Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1945).
207. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
208. Id. (quoting In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d
1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
209. One district court went so far as to cite, then disregard, Iqbal in the
ATS context, stating that “[n]othing in Iqbal suggests that the pleading standard it articulates applies to ATCA claims.” Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 650 F.
Supp. 2d 1004, 1021 n.44 (C.D. Cal. 2009). An initial reaction to the court’s
discussion is that it missed Iqbal’s point on its transsubstantive application.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1,
but then stating that Twombly “applies to antitrust and discrimination suits
alike”); Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the Probable: Defining the Plausibility Standard After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94 MINN. L. REV. 505, 506 (2009) (“[T]he plausibility standard is a transsubstantive pleading standard applicable to all claims brought in
federal court.”). On closer examination, however, the court’s result (although it
gives no reasoning) is supportable because Iqbal is not “transprocedural”—
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C. THE APPLICABILITY OF TWOMBLY-IQBAL IN ATS CASES
The diversity of application of plausibility pleading, especially in the Eleventh and Second Circuits, indicates the need
for reflection on the meaning of this pleading standard in human rights litigation. After establishing ATS jurisdiction under
Sosa’s historical paradigms test, a claim must have the facial
plausibility that Twombly-Iqbal requires to withstand a Rule
12(b)(6) challenge. To flesh out the narrow scope of the plausibility standard, this section discusses the nature of factual allegations that are permissible under Twombly-Iqbal.
A court must accept as true “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint.”210 Accepting these
facts, judges must rely on their “experience and common sense”
to decide whether the complaint is plausible.211 Under Twombly-Iqbal, courts must determine what facts are sufficiently
nonconclusory and whether those facts present a plausible
claim for relief.212 One type of fact entitled to the presumption
of truthfulness is one alleged upon information and belief.213
The Sinaltrainal court reacted with some hostility to certain
allegations that the plaintiffs had made “on information and
belief.”214 Finding that they did not allow for a “reasonable inference” of liability, the Eleventh Circuit struck out those allegations.215 The Second Circuit recently has clarified that the
simple fact that an allegation is based on the plaintiff’s information and belief does not make it suspect.216 Rather, facts alleged on information and belief may be credited when either
“the facts are peculiarly within the possession and control of

that is, its Rule 12(b)(6) analysis does not apply to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. See
S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489, 567 (2010) (stating that the Supreme Court has not
extended the Twombly-Iqbal standard from Rule 8(a)(2) to Rule 8(a)(1), but
arguing in favor of such a move); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 n.3 (2007) (relying on the term “showing” in Rule 8(a)(2), which is not
present in Rule 8(a)(1), for its holding).
210. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010).
211. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
212. Id.
213. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 24 –26, Shan v. China Constr. Bank
Corp., No. 10-2992 (2d Cir. Nov. 8, 2010), 2010 WL 4715538 (raising this argument and citing Second Circuit case law).
214. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949).
215. Id.
216. See Arista Records, L.L.C. v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010).
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the defendant”217 or “the belief is based on factual information
that makes the inference of culpability plausible.”218 Further,
even conclusory statements may survive Iqbal’s first prong
when they are based on sufficient, even circumstantial, evidence.219 In sum, the plausibility standard allows crediting allegations even when based on information in a defendants’ control, on belief when it is based on facts, and on circumstantial
evidence—as long as the court may reasonably infer liability
may be substantiated through discovery or at later stages of litigation.
Another type of factual allegation in ATS cases—those of
conspiracy—tends to get particularized treatment under the
plausibility standard.220 In cases alleging some form of conspiracy to commit human rights violations, courts often apply the
analysis of Twombly by analogizing (or distinguishing) the facts
in a given case.221 Plausible conspiracy, without any consideration of Iqbal’s analysis, requires that the allegations demonstrate more than parallel conduct and allow for the plausible
inference that an agreement exists.222 The District of Maryland, in Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, found that the allegations of a
conspiracy to commit acts of torture were sufficient because the
facts allowed an inference of more than simple parallel conduct
and the absence of an agreement was the more implausible deduction.223 The court viewed the facts most favorable to the
plaintiff and allowed conspiracy to be proven by circumstantial
evidence.224 To respond to defendants’ argument that the conspiracy allegations were “conclusory,” the court refused to
217. Id. (citing Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 2008)).
218. Id. (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949).
219. See Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 767–68 (D. Md. 2010)
(conspiracy claims).
220. See id.; see also Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 657 F. Supp.
2d 700, 703 (E.D. Va. 2009).
221. See Al Shimari, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 729–31. But see Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009) (applying the Iqbal analysis
to all claims, including conspiracy claims).
222. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550–51, 564 (2007); cf.
Amanda Sue Nichols, Note, Alien Tort Statute Accomplice Liability Cases:
Should Courts Apply the Plausibility Pleading Standard of Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177, 2207–08 (2008) (discussing the similarities of antitrust and ATS accomplice liability suits, and arguing for the application of Twombly in both cases).
223. Al-Quraishi, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 766–67.
224. Id. at 765. Interestingly, the court determined that the facts were sufficient for both conspiracy and aiding and abetting liability. Id. at 766.
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strike the conclusory statements because they were “‘supported
by factual allegations.’”225 That is, conclusory statements provide a useful framework that specific allegations can flesh out.
This special application of Twombly to conspiracy cases shows
that courts may find the plausibility standard has greater relevance to particular cases rather than “‘all civil actions.’”226
Thus employed, the plausibility standard may serve the
purpose of pleadings in our adversarial system. The standard
ensures that, at the pleadings stage, courts can differentiate
unmeritorious suits based on insufficient factual allegations
and legitimate claims that arise from actual defendant culpability. The Second Circuit’s application of the Twombly-Iqbal
standard, in contrast to that seen in the Eleventh Circuit’s initial cases, does that in a way that is true both to Sosa and to
Twombly and Iqbal. Judge Leval’s “common sense” balance between the Iqbal methodology and the substantive ATS issues
provides just such a model.227 When approaching the plausibility standard in human rights litigation, courts must apply the
Twombly-Iqbal standard only to Rule 12(b)(6) motions and they
must do so in a limited and focused way to balance the needs of
plaintiffs and defendants in the early stages of civil litigation.
This legal analysis is supported by the policy analysis the Supreme Court has undertaken in the pleadings and ATS realms,
which is the focus of the next Part.
III. THE ROLE OF PLAUSIBILITY IN MOTIONS TO
DISMISS HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS
This Part concludes that plausibility pleading has only a
circumscribed role in human rights litigation under the ATS.
Courts need not apply a heightened plausibility standard to issues of ATS jurisdiction as the Eleventh Circuit and other
courts have done.228 Not only does the foregoing analysis lead
to this conclusion, but the substantial overlap of policy concerns
in Twombly-Iqbal and Sosa decisions supports such an implementation of the standard. The practical effects and policy jus225. Id. at 767 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009)).
226. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
227. Id. at 1950.
228. Some courts have done the reverse. See e.g., In re Sinaltrainal Litig.,
474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1275–76 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (justifying the application of
the Iqbal standard because of the Sosa policy of “judicial caution”), aff’d in
part, vacated in part sub nom. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252
(11th Cir. 2009).
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tifications of Sosa are similar to those in Twombly-Iqbal. Thus,
courts can rest assured that, by analyzing jurisdictional challenges under Sosa and merits challenges under Twombly-Iqbal,
they adequately are balancing the needs of defendants and
plaintiffs. To explicate this conclusion, this Part examines and
compares the policy behind these recent decisions.
The major policy concern behind Twombly was the proper
role of discovery.229 While arguably the federal rules policy
worked “not to keep litigants out of court but rather to keep
them in,”230 the Supreme Court justified its interpretation of
Rule 8(a)(2) in Twombly because expensive and timeconsuming litigation should be weeded out at the earliest possible phase.231 The Court determined that discovery in an antitrust case can be unwieldy and too costly for defendants232 and
that it was inefficient and unfair to defendants to allow a suit
to move to the discovery stage on the basis of flimsy pleadings.233 The concern with unwieldy discovery is likewise
present in ATS litigation, which may focus on events, people,
and evidence spread across continents. The Sosa Court, while
not addressing this concern directly, responds to it by setting a
“high bar to new private causes of action.”234 Sosa’s standard is
sufficiently strenuous to weed out unmeritorious claims without also eliminating legitimate claims that will gain strength
through discovery.235
The Iqbal Court similarly was concerned with “unlock[ing]
the doors of discovery.”236 In Iqbal, the Court’s emphasis on discovery arose out of the specific arguments in the case.237 Because of the defendants’ claims to qualified immunity, the costs
229. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558–60 (2007); see also
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953–54.
230. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 575 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
231. Id. at 558–59 (majority opinion).
232. Id. at 558–64.
233. Id. at 558; see also Spencer, supra note 123, at 21–25 (arguing that, in
balancing efficiency and justice in pleading standards, the Supreme Court
tipped the scales toward the side of efficiency).
234. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004).
235. Consider the court’s disposition of a motion to dismiss in In re XE Services Alien Tort Litigation, 665 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Va. 2009): the court, in
its dismissal order of a number of claims, simultaneously granted leave to
amend. Id. at 603. Such an action indicates that the court did not judge the
claims, which were filed before Iqbal, to be unmeritorious even though they
failed the plausibility test.
236. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
237. See id. at 1945–46.
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of discovery went beyond monetary burdens.238 In addition to
the discovery costs in time and money upon government officials, the defendants complained that the ex ante impediment
of a threat of lawsuits might limit officials’ ability to complete
their duties.239 The possibility that discovery might lead to revealing sensitive executive branch information, especially regarding the U.S. government’s national security efforts in response to the events of September 11, 2001, increased this
concern.240 The Court announced its more stringent pleading
standard in light of discovery concerns in antitrust litigation.241
Yet the Court did not explicitly apply that heightened plausibility standard to “‘all civil actions’” until faced with a case concerning the more sensitive area of national security, the separation of powers between courts and the political branches, and
judicial review of high-ranking executive branch officials’ actions.242
The Iqbal Court’s policy concerns in a strict pleading standard overlapped greatly with the Sosa Court’s policy concerns in
limiting actionable causes in ATS litigation. In “argu[ing] for
great caution in adapting the law of nations to private rights,”
Justice Souter’s majority opinion presented five major concerns.243 These policy concerns focused on the role of federal
common law post-Erie, the role of the legislature in the process
of creating private rights of action, and, especially, the impact
that ATS suits on foreign relations and executive power in that
arena.244 The Court affirmed the position of the ATS in providing jurisdiction for certain causes of action in international law,
but only after carefully weighing the sensitive concerns arising
out of U.S. foreign relations, the separation of powers between
the courts and the political branches, and the role of executive
power operating in that area.245 The policies and the effects of
Iqbal’s new heightened pleading standard, thus, are substantially the same as those enunciated in the ATS context by Sosa.
The Court’s standard for ATS jurisdiction in Sosa sufficiently upped the ante in ATS suits to weed out meritless
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

See id. at 1953–54.
Id.
Id. at 1953.
Id.
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725–28 (2004).
Id.
See id. at 728–31.
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claims. While not requiring fact pleading, the standard’s requirements presented a high bar for defining a cause of action
at the jurisdictional stage. The Court justified this standard for
ATS claims because of concerns with the federal judiciary’s role
with respect to foreign relations and the expenses of international human rights litigation.246 These policy justifications are
closely tracked by the Court’s reasoning in Twombly and Iqbal.247 The Iqbal Court justified this new standard because of
the serious policy implications of discovery regarding national
security issues and the work of executive branch officials in
responding to crises.248 Thus, these two sets of precedents,
when properly applied in their respective procedural arenas,
can protect defendants from costly and meritless litigation
while allowing plaintiffs the free and easy access to courts that
our justice system promises.
CONCLUSION
When Twombly came down in 2007, commentators and litigants alike questioned the meaning and scope of this decision.
The Supreme Court largely answered those questions in Iqbal
two years later. Now as the legal profession and the legal academy try to respond to the new decisions on plausibility standards, this Note has attempted a fill the gap in the literature
concerning the effects of the new standard on human rights litigation under the ATS. This analysis of pleading standards in
motions to dismiss reveals that courts are not only unclear
about what Twombly-Iqbal means for ATS cases, but that
courts still struggle with the appropriate application of Sosa to
pleading ATS cases. Thus, this Note clarifies the historical paradigm test of ATS subject-matter jurisdiction under Sosa and
highlights the proper approach to plausibility pleading following Twombly-Iqbal. Properly understanding the legal distinction between those two concepts as well as the policy considerations animating these two lines of cases indicates that
plausibility does not and need not have a huge impact in ATS
litigation. Instead of fulfilling the prophecy that plausibility
will irreparably damage litigants’ access to justice, courts
should apply a narrowly tailored version of the plausibility
pleading standard in Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss ATS
246. Id. at 725–28.
247. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1946, 1953–54; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 558–59 (2007).
248. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953–54.
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claims to balance the needs of plaintiffs and defendants in holding human rights violators accountable.

